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When I was studying at Oxford, trying to find my way among the formidable 
consequentialists and quasi-utilitarians, G.A. Cohen’s uncompromising personal and 
philosophical commitment to equality deeply resonated with me.1  His more theoretical projects, 
which spanned over a remarkable career of nearly fifty years, along with his admirable personal 
activities and stances in support of worthy social causes, were guided by the basic moral 
conviction that it is unfair when some people are better off than others due to morally arbitrary 
features of themselves or the world around them.  With great ingenuity, subtlety and skill he 
steadily refined his conception of ‘luck egalitarianism’, which rules out inequalities not based on 
“some choice or fault or desert on the part of (some of) the relevant affected agents”,2 and helped 
to rekindle an intense and ongoing debate about how best to interpret the values of equality and 
justice, render them more determinate, and apply them to our social world.  In addition to 
developing his own socialist views of these matters, Cohen has fruitfully engaged with other 
philosophical traditions, devoting a significant portion of his impressive book Rescuing Justice 
                                                
1 I have benefited from discussions with Elizabeth Anderson, G.A. Cohen, Jon Garthoff, Thomas E. Hill, Alex 
Kaufman and David Reidy, as well as participants at a 2010 APSA panel on Cohen’s work. 
2 G. A. Cohen, Rescuing justice and equality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 7.  I will refer 
2 G. A. Cohen, Rescuing justice and equality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 7.  I will refer 
to this book as RJE. 
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and Equality to criticizing liberal political theory as exemplified in the work of John Rawls.3  As 
someone who studied with Cohen, but who has deep Rawlsian roots, I am pleased to have this 
opportunity to highlight some of the main controversies between these philosophers, emphasize 
some overlap between them, and raise some reservations I have about Cohen’s criticisms of 
Rawls that I hope will improve our understanding of the values that both saw as so profoundly 
important for theory and practice. 
Cohen accuses Rawls of illicitly tailoring basic principles of justice to the ‘crooked 
wood’ of human nature.4  We are naturally self-interested, for example, so justice must entice us 
to conform to requirements that cannot be too demanding, whereas Cohen thinks we should 
distinguish more clearly between pure justice and its pragmatic implementation.  My suggestion 
is that, strictly speaking, Rawls does not rely on facts of any kind to define his constructive 
procedure or to argue that his principles of justice would be its result – facts come in later to 
determine whether actual people satisfy the moral conceptions he defines and to determine 
whether his principles of justice can be stable for the right reasons.  A distinguishing feature of 
normative constructivism, I claim, is that it begins with stipulated models that can include 
normative and descriptive stipulations; we then engage in a priori reflection about what these 
                                                
3 I will refer to Rawls’ works using the following symbols followed by page numbers:  TJ – John Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice (Rev. edn.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999); PL – John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New 
York: Columbia University Press ,1993); R – John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2001); LHPP – John Rawls, John and Samuel Freeman, Lectures on the History of 
Political Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007); and JAF – John Rawls, 'Justice as 
Fairness', in Samuel Freeman (ed.), Collected papers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 47-
72. 
4 Recent discussions of this disagreement between Rawls and Cohen include Michael Buckley, ‘The structure of 
justification in political constructivism’, Metaphilosophy 41 (2010), 669-689; Joshua Cohen, ‘Taking People as they 
Are’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 30 (2001), 363-86; Samuel Freeman, Rawls. (New York: Routledge, 2007); A. 
Faik Kurtulmus, ‘Rawls and Cohen on facts and principles’, Utilitas 21 (2009), 489-505; Andrew Mason, ‘What is 
the point of justice?’, Utilitas 24 (2012), 525-547; Thomas Pogge, ‘Cohen to the rescue!’, Ratio 21 (2008), 454-475; 
Thomas Pogge, ‘On the Site of Distributive Justice: Reflections on Cohen and Murphy’, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 29 (2000), 137-69; Kok-Chor Tan, ‘Justice and Personal Pursuits’, Journal of Philosophy 101 (2004), 331-
62; and Andrew Williams, ‘Justice, incentives and constructivism’, Ratio, 21 (2008), 476-493. 
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models presuppose and how they relate to one another.  Rawls appeals to commonsense morality 
to partially define a citizen as someone who is engaged in social cooperation with others and a 
society as a fair system of cooperation; he then draws from these organizing ideas to characterize 
the original position for choosing principles of social regulation for societies and citizens so 
defined. Whether or not there are any actual people or societies that match Rawls’ models is a 
different matter, and irrelevant to the internal structure of his theory, but if the models do apply 
to people and societies in the real world then Rawls has given a powerful argument that his 
principles of justice are the most reasonable for them.  According to my interpretation, rather 
than watering down principles of justice to suit human nature, Rawls relies only on a priori 
grounds to characterize the original position and to argue that the two principles of justice will be 
its result; and he hopes that we can live up to the moral self-conceptions that underlie them. 
Background 
Cohen urges a return to the ancient and Old Church doctrine that there exists a fully 
comprehensive standard that says what each of us deserves, and justice is a matter of getting 
what God, the Forms or some other independently existing moral order marks out for us.  Our 
motives, actions and institutions are just, then, in virtue of how they match reward to desert.  In 
light of certain general limitations and capacities of human nature, however, it will usually be 
unfeasible for us actually to employ and institute these standards with any great precision – what 
people deserve is extremely complicated and so unlikely to be widely known, generally 
understood, taught to children, used in everyday moral or political discussions, guide public 
discussions, or reliably move us to act.  Practical concerns about the publicity and stability of 
putative requirements of justice, for example, how liable they are to being abused, and the ease 
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with which they can be made into workable laws are considered mostly beside the point when it 
comes to identifying what justice truly is at its most fundamental level.  There are notable 
exceptions that will require us to address concerns of feasibility directly, such as what we teach 
our children about the order of justice, how much time we spend trying to decipher it, 
determining whether are we even capable of doing what it putatively requires, and assessing 
which conventions of assurance, expectation and coordination to establish and maintain.  But by 
and large the most basic requirements of justice are thought to be independent of our ability to 
learn, share and be guided by them. 
A major theme of Cohen’s case against Rawls is the intuitively compelling thought that 
we should not (indeed we cannot) bend justice to accommodate human foibles, social limitations 
or historical accidents.  Justice stands as an abstract and fundamental ideal that is universal, 
inflexible, comprehensive, and not subject to empirical confirmation or constraint.  While we 
must try to apply and implement justice as best we can in specific times and places, it will almost 
always be unfeasible or unworkable for us to do so perfectly. But we should not pretend that our 
own difficulties in doing full justice warrant any dilution of justice itself – that would be akin to, 
as we sometimes say, ‘watering down the test’ because some students have difficulty passing it.5   
When, for example, Abraham Lincoln publicly supported the 1861 Corwin Amendment, 
which protected slavery in states in which it already existed, he may have been right to make 
concessions to political expediency and other values, but he arguably understood that the 
obstacles to abolishing slavery (particularly those involving the immoral threats of slave-holders 
themselves) had no bearing on the simple truth that slavery is profoundly unjust.  If we start 
tailoring justice to the ‘crooked wood’ of human nature then we risk rewarding bad behavior by 
                                                
5 RJE 254. 
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allowing people who stand in the way of justice more goods than they deserve – for example, it 
may already be unjust for the more talented members of society simply to hold out for greater 
rewards for their efforts knowing that doing so will indirectly benefit the least advantaged; 
whereas it would be more just for them to work harder for the sake of their comrades.  Taking 
facts of feasibility into account when crafting principles of justice would also pollute true justice 
and possibly commit us to the counterintuitive view that if empirical circumstances had been 
different then, for example, slavery as it was practiced in the American South may have been 
just.6   
Rawls, on the other hand, thinks that the most basic principles of political justice for the 
basic structures of a closed, well-ordered society existing under reasonably favorable conditions 
depend on a whole host of supposed facts.7  These include assumptions about the psychological 
and physical makeup of its citizens, including the desire to reciprocate with others and to pursue 
a rational plan of life, the ability to engage in fair social cooperation along with the goods that 
are essential for them to do so, and the possibility that they will develop over time a sufficient 
allegiance to their society’s fundamental principles of justice.  Also included are general 
assumptions about society such as that it exists under conditions of limited scarcity of resources, 
that its citizens will inevitably affirm an irreducible plurality of reasonable moral, religious and 
philosophical comprehensive views8, and that securing general adherence to any one of these 
doctrines can occur only through the oppressive application of political power.9  It is a basic 
feature of political constructivism, as Rawls understands it, that the procedure for choosing 
                                                
6 RJE 259, 265-8 and chapter 7.  Rational intuitionists, Kantians and others object to Hume and other sentimentalist 
theories on this last point. 
7 TJ 137. 
8 This is the fact of reasonable pluralism, as Rawls calls it. 
9 On this last feature, see R 34.  I discuss the others shortly. 
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principles of justice must be sensitive to descriptive features about the persons and society that 
are to be regulated by the resulting principles.10  
Before we consider whether incorporating these considerations into his theory of justice 
is a deep problem for Rawls, we should note that there is much in Cohen’s aspirational view of 
justice that Rawls would approve of, including its strong opposition to welfarism, libertarianism 
and aggregative reasoning; its insistence on the inviolable status of persons; its reluctance to 
tailor fundamental justice to facts about a person’s age, gender, or race or to ground justice in 
human sentiments or feelings; and the underlying egalitarian intuition that people should not be 
favored or disfavored by social institutions simply because of their place in the natural or social 
lotteries.  Rawls is also careful, especially in his later work, not to disparage or deny the 
possibility of developing a comprehensive theory of the sort Cohen envisions, even claiming that 
the procedure of construction he describes there is not meant to constitute moral validity or 
objectivity but merely represent it, leaving open the possibility of an independently existing 
order of justice.11 
Reasons and principles 
Surprisingly, one of the deepest points of agreement between Rawls and Cohen is, I 
think, about the abstract relationship between facts and principles.  In addition to Cohen’s 
intuitive remarks about the need to keep basic justice purified of facts about human nature and 
society – justice is one thing, he urges, and its application another – he subtly develops a 
complicated and vexing meta-ethical argument that is meant to reveal a fatal flaw in 
                                                
10 TJ 398. 
11 PL 95. 
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constructivist thinking.12  According to that argument, “whenever a fact F confers support on a 
principle P, there is an explanation why F supports P”13, this explanation “implies a more 
ultimate principle, commitment to which would survive denial of F”14, this sequence of 
explanations will not “go on indefinitely”15, so the “[moral] principles at the summit of our 
[moral] conviction are grounded in no facts whatsoever.”16   
Before considering whether Cohen is right that this argument reveals a fundamental error 
in constructivist thinking, there is a way in which the argument, taken in one way, shows Cohen 
and Rawls (along with Kant before them17) to be standing together against a current trend in 
moral and political philosophy.  It is common nowadays to take reasons as primitive and free-
floating entities that do not in general admit of further moral explanation.  Reasons are all around 
us, many philosophers think, so what we ought to do, what institutions we ought to establish and 
so on is merely a function of how the pertinent reasons combine together, which they often do in 
complex and complicated ways.18  Details aside, the basic point of Cohen’s argument, as I 
interpret it, is to resist this picture of reasons and replace it with one that says that whenever a 
fact is a reason for something – for example, the fact that I promised to attend your recital is, 
plausibly enough, a reason for me to do so – there is always a further question about what makes 
                                                
12 He does so mainly in Chapter 6 of Rescuing Justice. 
13 RJE 236. 
14 RJE 236. 
15 RJE 237. 
16 RJE 229. 
17 Curiously, Cohen does not note the connection with Kant, who argues that all reasons must be explained and 
justified by higher-level principles of rationality, whether the Categorical Imperative or the Hypothetical Imperative.  
See Immanuel Kant and Thomas E. Hill, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2002).  For a discussion of Kant in this connection, see Thomas E. Hill, The Importance of Moral Rules and 
Principles (The Lindley lecture 2006; Lawrence, Kan.: University of Kansas Press 2007). 
18 Philosophers who hold this view of reasons include: Thomas Scanlon, What we Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998); Jonathan Dancy, Ethics Without Principles (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004); Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); and Frances Kamm, 
'Morality, Mortality', (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
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that fact a reason – why does it matter for my plans that I promised to be there?  That further 
question can be answered only by appeal to a moral principle that justifies the claim that the fact 
at issue is indeed a reason – there is arguably a moral principle that says that within certain limits 
we should keep our promises, and because none of its relevant excusing conditions apply, we 
have a rationale that explains why the fact that I made a promise to be at the recital is a reason 
for me to go.  If we go on to ask what justifies the moral principle about promise-keeping, one 
reply is that when people keep their promises then everyone tends to be better off, but then we 
would need a still further explanation for why that fact grounds a principle of fiduciary 
obligation.  Ultimately, according to this conception of reasons, we end up with a moral principle 
that is not justified by any facts, such as the utilitarian one that we ought to maximize overall 
utility or a self-evident prima facie duty of fidelity.   
Rawls agrees that, as a general matter, principles are needed to pick out facts and make 
them into reasons, although he denies that the series of ‘why’ questions tops out in a super-
principle of the sort Cohen supposes.  Cohen seems to be working with a sort of subsumption 
model of moral justification in which, for example, lower-level principles such as ‘children 
deserve respect’ are justified because they are subsumed under higher level ones such as ‘all 
people deserve respect’ along with relevant facts such as ‘children are people’.  Similarly, 
according to Cohen, principles of justice for a certain sort of society consisting of a particular 
kind of people can be justified only in a ‘top-down’ fashion in which they are subsumed under a 
more comprehensive and basic principle of justice that applies everywhere and always.  At least 
for political purposes, Rawls questions whether this is the right way to think about justification.  
He proposes that justification is always to someone and does not always proceed in such a 
straightforward, logical fashion; instead, we begin with a cluster of shared moral ideas, norms 
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and values that provide materials for constructing principles of justice that are then capable of 
picking out facts and making them into reasons.19  
Nonetheless, Cohen thinks that his point reveals a deep inconsistency in Rawls’ 
thinking.20  Rawls claims that his two principles of justice are both “fundamental”21 and also 
partially “justified by the conditions of our life as we know it.”22  According to Cohen’s 
argument, if the facts about our condition really do justify Rawls’ principles of justice then we 
need explanation for why this is so – these reasons cannot stand on their own – and this 
explanation must appeal to more and more fundamental principles of justice until, Cohen thinks, 
we end up with a truly fundamental principle of justice that is itself not justified by any facts 
about us or anything else.  This principle of justice, which could be applied to all agents, times 
and places, is the one that would be fundamental, not Rawls’ two principles, which are at best 
lower-level, derivative standards of social regulation for a world like ours.   
Models of the person, society and the role of justice 
Meeting Cohen’s basic challenge that justice is one thing and facts about its 
implementation another, whether we express it formally or intuitively, requires emphasizing and 
perhaps supplementing some under-discussed aspects of Rawls’ view that I think are among his 
most original, revolutionary and enduring insights.23  These parts of his theory come at higher 
                                                
19 PL 122. 
20 Cohen develops these supposed implications of his argument in chapters 7 and 8 of Rescuing Justice. 
21 TJ 137. 
22 TJ 398. 
23 My main focus here is on interpreting Rawls’ later views in Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness: A 




and lower levels than the machinery of the original position24, the particular specification of the 
two principles of justice, and the specific arguments he gives from the latter to the former.   
It is particularly clear in Political Liberalism that, for purposes of his theory, Rawls is 
starting with a set of widely shared and deeply held political convictions (e.g. slavery and 
religious persecution are unjust)25 and values (e.g., the common good, freedom, equality, 
fairness, toleration, impartiality, civility, mutual-respect).26  These starting points may have to be 
more ‘deeply’ justified in a different context – Rawls leaves open, for example, whether they 
have a basis in an external moral order or pure practical reason – but we take them as 
provisionally fixed for now, not because they show up on sociological studies about our public 
political culture, but because rational and reasonable people over time have tended to endorse 
them.   
A central task of political philosophy, as Rawls sees it, is to interpret these somewhat 
abstract, vague and potentially conflicting values and judgments, render them more determinate 
and apply them to real-world situations, all in ways that can secure reasoned and free agreement 
among persons, or at least diminish conflict among them, on more divisive political questions.27  
There are various ways we might proceed.  We might consult our intuitions about a host of real 
and imaginary cases and try to generalize them into principles.  One of Rawls’ insights was to 
note the overwhelming complexity and indeterminacy of interpreting our basic moral convictions 
and values in any direct way that could be applicable to our world, particularly because going 
case by case may lead us to miss crucial systematic features of justice.   
                                                
24 In the first stage of the original position, at least, we choose principles of justice without taking account of its 
potential to be stable for the right reasons; those concerns only come in to the second stage where we test whether 
our resulting principles can be stable in the right way.  See PL 140-1. 
25 PL 124. 
26 LHPP 6; PL 122. 
27 LHPP 10; PL 100-1. 
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Rawls tries instead to interpret and apply these commonsense judgments and values in 
stages, beginning with a set of moral conceptions that help to organize and structure them.  His 
basic methodology is to begin by settling on a conception of what a society is, what it is to be a 
citizen of a society, and what role principles of political justice are supposed to serve there.  
These conceptions of society, the person and the role of justice will have moral and descriptive 
elements – a society, for example, is not just a collection of people but one guided by fair terms 
of cooperation; and its members do not count as cooperating in the fullest sense unless there is a 
limited scarcity of resources.28  We then see how far we can get by engaging in a priori reflection 
about what these moral concepts presuppose and how they fit together.  Rawls’ own suggestion 
is to construct a procedure for choosing principles of political justice that reflect and incorporate 
the values and judgments that are implicit in these conceptions of society, the person and the role 
of justice.  When we are finished, we will hopefully have a set of principles that can play the 
required role of political justice in a society of citizens.   
But we cannot stop here because, for all that has been said, the models of society, the 
person and the role of justice we have defined may be illusions, that is, they may not be satisfied 
by anything or have any grounding or basis in the real world.29  No actual societies and citizens 
in Rawls’ sense may exist – perhaps we lack a sense of justice and see our social structures as 
mere means for our own ends – but even then it could be that with enough hard work we can 
reasonably hope to make ourselves into persons and a society in Rawls laudable senses.  We 
must investigate our own world to see whether our moral ideas of the person, society and justice 
                                                
28 TJ 109-110. 
29 This is similar to Kant’s claim that he must switch his methodology in the Groundwork from an analytic 
investigation of our common notions of ‘good will’ and ‘duty’, which he thinks presuppose the Categorical 
Imperative, to a synthetic one that tries to show that these ideas themselves are not mere illusions by arguing that, at 
least for practical purposes, we must take ourselves to have autonomy of the will of the sort that is presupposed by 
our common moral notions. 
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have any grounding or application here.  Those ideas themselves, however, are not sensitive to 
facts, but instead include assumptions that purport to describe the world even though they may or 
may not do so.  If the ideas do apply, however, and Rawls’ political theory is correct, then we 
have a strong argument that his principles of justice are correct for their intended domain. 
Rawls’ morally loaded conceptions of the person, society and political justice are not 
arbitrary, then, but are inherent in the values we share with each other and the particular 
problems we want to address.  These conceptions are part of the nature of figuring out how 
people of a certain type could live together in fair, respectful and decent ways.  Let’s briefly 
consider these three conceptions in turn. 
(1) We have, Rawls thinks, a moral idea of what it is to be a full citizen, an idea that is 
not drawn from science or empirical research but comes from careful reflection about how we 
see ourselves in society.  This idea is expressed, for instance, in the Declaration of Independence 
and the Preamble to the US Constitution.30  When we ask what aspects of ourselves qualify us 
for membership in society, we find that it is not our gender, race or genetic make-up; rather, 
Rawls thinks, we are full citizens, whatever else we are, in virtue of being engaged in social 
cooperation with others.  This implies that we have the ability and willingness to cooperate with 
others on mutually agreeable terms, we have whatever goods are required for us to do so, and we 
have the ability and willingness to reflect critically about a plan of life for ourselves and to 
pursue it.31  Also part of our idea of the person qua citizen is that we are politically free in the 
sense that our claims on political society are prima facie valid in themselves, without needing to 
                                                
30 R 29. 
31 Rawls calls these abilities the two moral powers.  See PL 108. 
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be backed up by God, slave-masters or an independent moral order; and we are politically equal 
in virtue of having these two moral powers rather than by belonging to a certain caste or race.32   
(2) When we reflect on what a society is and what makes it different from a mere 
collection of people, we find that a society is not just a group of self-interested people who have 
managed to coordinate their behavior in mutually advantageous ways; nor must a society always 
involve a community of people who share the same fundamental moral, political or religious 
values.33  Rawls’ suggestion contains elements of both proposals – according to him a society 
exists when a group of people, who are citizens and see each other as such, are engaged together 
in cooperative activities over long periods of time on the basis of fair and publicly shared rules.34  
The citizens of a society cooperate in ways that further their own plans of life, so circumstances 
must be such that cooperation among them is possible and necessary35, but they do so within the 
constraints of fair rules that they generally accept and comply with as long as others do so as 
well.36   
We cannot assume that citizens in a society will share the same fundamental values and 
ideals, however, because it is part of being a reasonable and rational person that, when we are 
afforded the freedoms offered by a fair system of generally accepted rules under reasonably 
favorable conditions, we will engage our powers of reason and think for ourselves.  The 
complexities of the moral, political and religious issues we consider and the difficulties in 
interpreting relevant evidence, however, will prevent us from reaching agreement on many of 
                                                
32 R 29. 
33 R 3; PL 146; R 3. 
34 R 4. 
35 TOJ 109. 
36 R 20-1. 
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them.37  Oppressive and coercive power would thus be required to transform a society into a 
community of people who are all committed to the same fundamental values and ideals.   
Rawls also assumes that in a society of citizens, who he assumes are roughly equal in 
their physical and mental abilities, great inequalities will be rare and not persist for very long.38  
And he emphasizes that societies cannot just be governed by complicated, abstract principles or 
propositions that no one knows, accepts, or affirms; instead, when societies exist, they are 
institutional structures governed by rules that are generally known, shared, complied with and so 
on.   
(3) The citizens of a society will have competing claims on the distribution if its benefits 
and burdens, and they will insist on having their claims adjudicated in non-arbitrary ways from a 
mutually acceptable point of view, one that is provided by a system of rules and procedures that 
in some way advance the common good of society.39  On reflection, we deeply value justifying 
ourselves to others, so Rawls argues that a society needs a shared point of view for resolving 
more particular disputes that each of us can accept and affirm.  Social justice, then, is a 
functional concept – it is defined as whatever fills this valuable role in a society of persons40, 
which means that there can be other virtues of a society and other notions of justice for 
individual choice, small-group associations, or international relations.  A conception of political 
social justice is one that is worked out for the most basic parts of the main social, political and 
economic institutions of a society.   
Along with adjudicating conflicting claims, then, the role of political justice is to provide 
a valuable standpoint for citizens to justify to one another the basic inner-workings of their 
                                                
37 R 36-7. 
38 TOJ 137. 
39 TOJ 109; JAF 48; R 27. 
40 R 27. 
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society.  In order to do this, however, Rawls argues that a political conception of justice must be 
stable and public.  It must be stable in the sense that, when such a conception is in place and 
governing the basic structures of a society, the citizens who are subject to it generally affirm it 
from within their diverse moral, philosophical and religious perspectives, for otherwise there 
would be no common point of view for them to resolve their disputes.  And the basic 
requirements of political justice must be publicly known and recognized, not only because rules 
are by nature public, but also because a shared basis of justification must be widely known and 
generally understood among those who are to make use of it. 
Reasoning with models 
With the stipulated models of the person, a society and the role of political justice in 
hand, we have something of an argument that certain putative political conceptions of justice, 
including a meritocratic one like Cohen’s, that presuppose controversial moral, political and 
possibly metaphysical ideas cannot serve the role of political justice in a society, which involves 
providing a shared point of view for adjudicating conflicting claims among its citizens.  We 
cannot expect free-thinking people living in more or less free societies to settle on an 
independent order or outside authority to tell them what each deserves, for example, but we also 
do not want to deny that there is an independent moral or religious order of that sort.  The only 
real alternative we have is the constructivist one of using the idea of fair agreement among 
equals to specify the terms of political justice and hope that it can gain sufficient adherence 
among people with their various beliefs, values and ideals.   
The underlying thought is that our convictions about the procedure itself are strong 
enough to sustain reasoned and free agreement among reasonable and rational people, exercising 
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common human reason in diverse ways, on the otherwise controversial political issues taken up 
from that standpoint.  The original position is Rawls’ own attempt at doing this, but he admits 
that there is room for disagreement about whether it best reflects the widely-shared and firmly-
held values and convictions that go into a fair procedure for specifying principles of political 
justice.  He also leaves room for doubt about whether the arguments he gives from within that 
standpoint are the best ones available, whether his two principles of justice are the ones that 
would result from such a procedure, and whether in the end his conception of justice as fairness 
can be stable in the right way.41   
In Part III of A Theory of Justice, however, Rawls explicitly speculates about some 
principles of human psychology that might serve to develop and sustain a strong desire to accept 
and comply with his two principles of justice if we were to grow up against the background of a 
society that had successfully instituted them.  He later emphasizes that the justification for doing 
so, however, is that it is part of our idea of political justice that it is meant to serve as a public 
basis of justification, so we must investigate whether a conception of political justice can be 
stable for the right reasons in our world.  We must also endeavor to see whether it can be 
publicly known and understood by us in light of our cognitive limitations and our propensities 
for abusing principles and making exceptions of ourselves, for if a conception of justice is not 
public knowledge then it cannot serve its proper and valuable social role.  By taking account of 
stability and publicity, Rawls is not sacrificing justice to feasibility, but expressing the view that 
the political justice by its very nature must be sensitive to such concerns.  For all he says, 
however, human nature may just not be suited to instituting and maintaining a public and stable 
conception of justice.  Finally, whatever conception of justice we settle on in a suitable 
                                                
41 On TJ 126-7, Rawls lists in table form a variety of ways one might choose to construct the original position. 
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procedure of construction, Rawls argues that it will have to be interpreted and applied in various 
stages to more and more specific social circumstances in order to give concrete guidance about 
what to do.  
Cohen’s basic criticism of Rawls is that he wrongly incorporates facts about human 
nature and society into the arguments for the two principles of justice that Rawls then mistakenly 
regards as fundamental rather than derivative from principles of justice that are not justified on 
the basis of any facts.  While there are places where Rawls seems to be arguing along the lines 
that Cohen attributes to him, on my interpretation of his theory, the role of facts is more 
complicated than Cohen supposes.  The conceptions of the person, society and political justice 
contain descriptive elements that, unlike facts, may or may not hold true in the world.  It is a 
constitutive part of our widely-held, value-laden notion of the person, for example, that we have 
a conception of our own good, but it could be that our idea of the person does not apply to the 
real world.  While it is possible that nothing satisfies our model, that there are no living, 
breathing persons in Rawls’ sense, this is separable from the internal coherence of the original 
position and the resulting two principles of justice and whether they offer the best interpretation 
of our widely-shared values and convictions about justice for societies and persons so defined.  
Perhaps, contrary to Rawls’ own faith, we should resign ourselves to the thought that our ideas of 
political justice are utterly unrealistic and have no basis in our own social structures or any 
reasonably foreseeable ones.  Rawls may have called the descriptive elements of his conceptions 
‘facts’, not in an effort to temper justice by sociology or psychology, but rather because he 
thought that, in addition to being essential features of some central moral ideas, they also happen 
to be true even though they may not have been so.  It is not their being true that justifies their 
inclusion in the theory, it is their relation to deeply held moral judgments and values.   
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There are some aspects of Rawls’ theory that are not descriptive elements in this sense 
but rather come in precisely because they are facts about ourselves and our world – those about 
what it takes for principles to be stable, public and applied to our circumstances are examples – 
but whenever this happens, there is an explanation for doing so that appeals to the basic and 
organizing ideas of the theory and the values that ground them.  The main point, then, is that 
Rawls is not sacrificing justice to feasibility, he is not polluting it with facts.  He is instead 
describing the conceptual and moral interplay among stipulated and un-interpreted models that 
characterize some of our most fundamental moral ideas and make certain assumptions about how 
things in fact are, even though they may ultimately have no application in the real world. 
I note two further implications of my reading of Rawls that are relevant to Cohen’s 
criticism of him.  The first is that, unlike Cohen, Rawls does not regard political justice as among 
the highest-level, universally applicable values such as freedom, equality or respect.  Rawls 
regarded his two principles of justice as fundamental, not because he failed to see that there is a 
more abstract and fundamental notion of justice that applies in all times and places.  Rawls 
thought that the very concept of justice only applies in specific social circumstances, that it does 
not make sense to talk about justice for beings with no ideas of their own good, who are unable 
to cooperate with each other on the basis of rules, who live in extreme scarcity, and so on.  The 
concept of political justice in Rawls’ sense contains certain descriptive elements and 
presuppositions that define the role it is meant to serve, so if he has specified that role correctly 
then it is possible that his two principles of justice are the most fundamental principles of justice 
there can be.  The descriptive elements of political justice, then, are not justifying that value, as 
Cohen assumes; instead, they are an ineliminable part of the nature of political justice itself.  A 
second implication is that, on Rawls’ view, his own conception of justice as fairness makes 
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political justice a derivative and composite value – the original position incorporates values of 
freedom, equality, impartiality, etc. and constructs from them what is, in a sense, a new value, 
which has these more basic values as parts.  
Suppose now, as Rawls allows, that there is a moral order, independent of our own 
construction, that tells us what each person deserves.  Cohen’s position is that more practical 
concerns come in only when applying this standard to particular circumstances.  In Political 
Liberalism, however, Rawls in effect asks Cohen to set aside his comprehensive moral standard 
of merit for the purpose of working out political principles for arranging the main institutions of 
society.42  Instead, Cohen is to draw on his own widely-shared convictions about fairness, 
equality, peace, security, and the common good to try working out with other reasonable people 
who may disagree with him on moral matters terms of cooperation that are respectful and non-
coercive for all.   
Justice and solidarity 
If we descend from these abstractions and go back to what was motivating Cohen’s basic 
challenge to Rawls, one thing we find is that Cohen had deep practical concerns about allowing 
talented people to ‘game the system’ by holding out for more money to do work that would 
indirectly benefit the least advantaged rather than requiring them as a matter of justice to put 
their talents to use without needing additional ‘goodies’ to do so.  Cohen may have thought that 
Rawls was conceding too much to such bad behavior by restricting political justice to the basic 
structures of our major social institutions rather than including individual choices within the 
purview of political justice as well.  This was a substantive decision on Rawls’ part, not dictated 
                                                
42 R 73. 
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by the ideas he was taking for granted, but one he saw a need to justify.  Rawls argued that the 
social institutions we grow up against have a pervasive effect on what moral intuitions, values 
and convictions we develop and they are a substantial part of the implicit background for the 
questions of personal morality we confront.  It is therefore important, Rawls thought, at least 
provisionally, to settle on principles for governing these institutions first before moving on to 
develop a moral theory about individual decision-making that would, among other things, say 
how the more fortunate should be putting their talents to use against the background of a 
progressive income tax.43   
From within Rawls’ theory, however, there is room to question whether we can maintain 
such a clear separation between institutional and personal justice.  One tentative suggestion, 
which I can only briefly mention here, is to take Rawls’ basic framework for granted, but alter 
and supplement some parts of his theory in an attempt to account for Cohen’s insights about the 
importance of individual decision-making in a fully just society.  In particular, suppose we revisit 
what it is to be a citizen of a society and claim that, in addition to pursuing our own plans of life 
and having a sense of justice, we are also strongly disposed to engage with other people in 
relationships of solidarity.  We are prone to stand in relationships of solidarity in families, sports 
teams, religious groups, and community organizations, but we also tend to see our society as a 
group of people who are working together in support of shared values of freedom, equality and 
justice and valuing for their own sake the solidary relationships that form on this basis.44  We 
                                                
43 This is similar to the way Kant divides the Metaphysics of Morals into the Doctrine of Right, which is concerned 
with legally enforced rights and justice, and the Doctrine of Virtue, which is about individual decision-making and 
laudable character traits.  With a few exceptions having to do with being legally ordered to perform grossly immoral 
acts, Kant works out political principles first, which then set background constraints on what we may do in our 
personal lives.  See Kant, Immanuel (1996), The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary J. Gregor (New York: 
Cambridge University Press). 
44 See Adam Cureton, ‘Solidarity and social moral rules’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2012), 691-706.  
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might try to model this new feature of persons in the original position by adding solidarity to the 
list of primary goods so that, in addition to each contractor insisting on rights, liberties, 
opportunities, income, wealth and the social bases of self-respect for herself, she will also insist 
on opportunities to engage in solidary relationships with others, perhaps even placing higher 
priority on the solidarity of society as a whole over other avenues of solidarity.45   
It is difficult to say how this would affect what principles of justice the parties would 
choose, although it would give additional grounds for making the resulting principles of justice 
public and stable so that they could serve as the focus of solidarity among the members of 
society.  One possibility, however, is that the parties would be less likely to adopt the difference 
principle because, by allowing for the sort of self-serving behavior that Cohen objects to, it 
makes society-wide solidarity more difficult to achieve.  We would not be manifesting solidarity 
with our fellow citizens, it seems, if we insist on more money for ourselves in order to help those 
in need – truly standing in that sort of relationship with them would move us to forgo certain 
benefits in order to help out others who were not so lucky.  Or, the parties may keep the 
difference principle but focus more on civic education in order to engender the sort of fraternal 
relationships that would lead the more talented to choose to do more with less.  They might even 
keep Rawls’ principles as they are, perhaps with some modifications to secure the background 
conditions that are needed for solidarity to exist, but take up another perspective that is designed 
for assessing informally created and enforced social moral rules, choosing ones that require the 
more talented members of society to put their abilities to use in certain ways without the need for 
greater compensation.   
                                                                                                                                                       
 
45 Rawls incorporates ideas of fraternity, fellow-feeling and cooperation into his theory at various places, but my 
suggestion is that engaging in deep personal relationships might be a primary good, which could ensure that justice 
forbids the sort of ‘gaming’ that worried Cohen. 
22 
 
This is regrettably speculative, and introducing further elements of this sort into Rawls’ 
theory runs the risk of making the view more controversial and less likely to be justifiable to 
those who claim not to value solidarity.  But it is worth exploring further whether the value of 
solidarity can be a bridge between two philosophers who, in a way, stood in solidarity together as 
they sought to understand the nature of justice and implement it in our world.  
 
